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Illinois v. Wardlow and the Crisis of




The Fourth Amendment requires courts to balance an
American citizen's individual liberty interests against law
enforcement's rights in fighting crime.1 The courts balance each
interest on opposite sides of the scales of justice.2 Although the
growing crisis of legitimacy in our minority communities is
altering this balance, 3 the courts have failed to take notice. 4
America's minority population, and even the majority
population, is beginning to suspect that one's experience with law
enforcement is linked directly to one's race. 5 In some cases, this
phenomenon extends beyond increased and disparate attention
from the police to harassment that involves police lawlessness. 6
This injustice results in a crisis of legitimacy: the disillusionment
of large segments of America's population with the criminal justice
system.7
This Article examines the crisis of legitimacy and suggests
that law enforcement and courts have failed to take the crisis into
account. Accordingly, when courts engage in a balancing test,
weighing the individual's interest in being free from unwanted
* J.D. expected 2001, University of Colorado; BA 1994, McGill University. The
author will serve as a judicial clerk to Chief Justice Mary Mullarkey of the
Colorado Supreme Court for the 2001-02 term.
1. The United States Constitution provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or thing to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See infra notes 140-148 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 19-44 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 136-222 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 94-135 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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government intrusion against law enforcement interests, they
engage in a fiction. This manifests itself in two ways. First, they
fail to give enough weight to the burden of intrusion that police
conduct may have on a reasonable, innocent person.8 Second,
when weighing the government interests purportedly advanced by
certain police tactics, the courts fail to recognize the effect of the
crisis of legitimacy on minority interaction with law enforcement
and other areas of the criminal justice system.9 As a result, the
courts give undue weight to police interests, discount the weight of
minority fears, and upset the proper balance in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.10
The best example of this flawed balancing is in the decision of
Illinois v. Wardlow," in which a five-Justice majority held that
fleeing from the police in a high-crime area constitutes reasonable
suspicion. 12  At first blush, this decision does not seem
problematic. We want police to catch criminals, and running away
arguably evinces some guilty mind. The Court's reasoning,
however, does not account for the crisis of legitimacy. When one
examines Wardlow with the crisis in mind, it becomes apparent
that the Court erred in its balancing of interests on each side.
Consequently, Wardlow will serve only to exacerbate the crisis of
legitimacy.
Section I of this Article documents the crisis of legitimacy by
examining the extent of the crisis and exploring the historical and
contemporary reasons for it. 13 Section II examines the Wardlow
decision, focusing on ways in which a failure to recognize
legitimacy issues leads the Court to false and perhaps self-
defeating conclusions. 14 It explores the errors the Court made in
applying the balancing test and ultimately suggests that the Court
was counterbalancing two interests that may actually weigh in on
the same side. 15  Section III offers suggestions to police
departments, state legislatures, and courts of ways to mitigate the
effects of Wardlow.16 It provides ways to use the knowledge we
have about the real costs of police behavior. 17  Rather than
8. See infra notes 184-186 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 198-222 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
11. 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000).
12. See id. at 676.
13. See infra notes 19-135 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 137-222 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 159-221 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 223-246 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 223-244 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 19:1
ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW
choosing law enforcement strategies that compound legitimacy
issues and ultimately increase crime, state and local governments
can hopefully make intelligent choices that will ameliorate the
effects of racially disproportionate policing and effectively reduce
crime.18
I. The Crisis of Legitimacy
A. The Extent of the Crisis of Legitimacy
Any government that does not assert its authority relies upon
its perceived authority to keep order.19 The government's
authority thus depends on this perceived legitimacy.20 Perceptions
of governmental illegitimacy can grow out of lawlessness among
the government agents as well as from arbitrary or unequal
enforcement of its laws. 21 When authority is called into question
to such an extent that its legitimacy is disbelieved, a crisis
ensues.22 In extreme cases, citizens not only lose faith in the
government, but also may consciously defy it.23 Those who choose
not to defy the government may simply fear its agents. 24 History
is replete with examples of this crisis of legitimacy leading to
internal strife, violence, and political revolutions. 25
In the United States, this crisis has long existed in our
marginalized communities. 26 "The system's legitimacy turns on
equality before the law, but the system's reality could not be
further from that ideal."27  Police are perceived to behave in
arbitrary ways, often targeting minority groups. 28 Many citizens
18. See infra notes 223-244 and accompanying text.
19. See CHRISTOPHER MCMAHON, AUTHORITY AND DEMOCRACY 25 (1994).
20. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4 (1990).
21. See id.; see also DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 172 (1999) (explaining that
"where people view criminal justice procedures as unfairly biased, they will be
especially likely to consider the law illegitimate and therefore less likely to comply
with the law").
22. See NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, THE WAR AGAINST AUTHORITY: FROM THE CRISIS
OF LEGITIMACY TO A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 163-67 (1995).
23. See id.
24. See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving
While Black"Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 273-74 (1999).
25. See KITTRIE, supra note 22, at 22, 237-47 (discussing some of the most
infamous examples, such as the French, American, and Russian revolutions, and
providing a comprehensive overview of the way in which the crisis of legitimacy has
played out historically).
26. See COLE, supra note 21, at 10-13.
27. Id. at 3.




also recognize that some police officers abuse their power by
engaging in outright aggression and other illegal behavior. 29 "To
those sections of the public with whom the police come most
frequently into contact, the men in uniform are regarded as rough,
capricious, discriminatory and corrupt."30  This phenomenon is
documented throughout American history, 31 and is recognized by
legal scholars, 32 social activists, 33 and U.S. Supreme Court
Justices alike. 34
Interviews conducted by Professor David Harris reveal the
depth of distrust and fear many people of color have of the police.35
One woman, who was pulled over and wrongly handcuffed and
arrested on her morning commute to work, explained why she did
not protest: "I didn't say nothing, because I figured if I said
anything, if I moved, that would just give them permission to beat
me."36 Another interviewee's comments echo this fear of arbitrary
police action. He recommended refraining from protesting police
attention, "because if you do something, maybe they're going to do
something else to you for no reason at all, because they have the
power .... It doesn't make a difference who you are. You're never
beyond this, because of the color of your skin."37
Police, then, are often more of a threat than a protection to
minority citizens:
[The police] are supposed to be there to protect and to serve, but you
being black and being male, you've got two strikes against you. Keep
your hands on the steering wheel, and do not run, because they will
shoot you in your back. Keep your hands on the steering wheel, let
them do whatever they want to do. I know it's humiliating, but let
them do whatever they want to do to make sure you get out of that
situation alive. Deal with your emotions later. Your emotions are
29. For examples of the abuse of power, see infra notes 95-132 and
accompanying text.
30. JOHN BREWER ET AL., THE POLICE, PUBLIC ORDER AND THE STATE 124 (2d
ed. 1996).
31. See David Cole, Race, Policing, and the Future of Criminal Law, HUM. RTS.
Q., Summer 1999, at 2 (citing a 1968 report that documents and articulates the
crisis of legitimacy).
32. See id.
33. See Bob Susnjara, Racial Profiling Report Sparks Debate, Sharp Words Fly
After Study Downplays Allegations, CHI. DAILY HERALD, May 16, 2000, News, at 1,
available at 2000 WL 2029777993.
34. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 441 n.1 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
35. See Harris, supra note 24, at 265.
36. Id. at 271 (citing Interview with Karen Brank, in Toledo, Ohio (Aug. 21,
1998)).
37. Id. at 273 (citing Interview with Michael, in Toledo, Ohio (Oct. 1, 1998)).
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going to come second - or last.
3 8
Although anecdotal, these quotations illustrate the fear many
African Americans have of the police based on their perception of
police illegitimacy.
Statistics offer support to this anecdotal evidence. A recent
study reported that only 57% of Americans have significant
confidence in the police.39 Regarding racial disparities in police
activity, 63% of African Americans felt the police in their
neighborhood treated at least one racial group unfairly, as did 52%
of Hispanics and 25% of Whites. 40 The crisis is magnified in urban
areas. A poll taken after the Diallo incident 4 indicates that 90%
of African Americans in New York City believed the police often
engaged in brutality against minorities and nearly two-thirds
thought this brutality was widespread. 42 Illustrative of the way in
which one's experience with the police is linked to race, only 24%
of Whites believed that this brutality against minorities exists. 43
Even the police admit to inequality in law enforcement.
Twenty-five percent of Los Angeles Police officers polled agreed
that "'racial bias (prejudice) on the part of officers toward minority
citizens currently exists and contributes to a negative interaction
between police and the community,' and that 'an officer's prejudice
toward the suspect's race may lead to the use of excessive force."' 44
B. Historical and Contemporary Reasons for the Crisis of
Legitimacy
1. Historical Reasons for the Crisis
There is little debate regarding the historically pervasive
racism endemic to our criminal justice system.45 Therefore, the
aim of this Section is not to engage in a detailed analysis of our
38. Id. at 274 (citing Interview with Karen Brank, in Toledo, Ohio (Aug. 21,
1998)).
39. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS,
tbl.2.16 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1998).
40. See id. at tbl.2.29.
41. Amadou Diallo was an African immigrant who, although he was unarmed,
was shot nineteen times by White police officers. See infra notes 110-115 and
accompanying text.
42. See Cole, supra note 31, at 2.
43. See id.
44. COLE, supra note 21, at 22 (quoting REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 69 (1991)).
45. See JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A
MULTIRACIAL AMERICA 91-428 (2000) (detailing the history of racism towards
African Americans, American Indians, Latino/as, and Asian Americans in the U.S.).
2001]
Law and Inequality
racist past, but rather to remind the reader of the historical
backdrop of our current problems.
Since the arrival of African Americans in the United States,
there has been a double standard in criminal justice. During the
years of slavery, African Americans were not considered citizens, 46
and therefore were afforded no rights or protections. 47  For
example, there was little redress for slaves that were beaten and
raped by their masters.48
Emancipation brought little if any justice to African
Americans with respect to the way law enforcement treated them.
There was still only nominal legal redress for African-American
victims, 49 and police officers, rather than officially arresting and
processing an African-American suspect, might simply give him or
her over to lynching mobs. 50 Moreover, when suspects were
arrested, confessions were beaten or otherwise scared out of
them.51 A common tactic was to inform a suspect that if he failed
to confess the officer would be forced to let in the angry mob
gathering outside the jailhouse. 52 Although these tactics were not
legal, there was no appointed counsel to litigate the abused
defendant's rights.53 In addition, the juries consisted exclusively of
White men.54
46. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 454 (1856) (holding, among other
things, that "negros" should not be afforded the rights of U.S. citizens).
47. See PEREA ET AL., supra note 45, at 108-11 (detailing the slave laws of
Virginia).
48. See id. at 114-17 (explaining that courts viewed battery and murder of
slaves as a mere property crime).
49. See JAMES W. CLARKE, Segregation, Disfranchisement and Legal Lynchings,
in LINEAMENTS OF WRATH: RACE, VIOLENT CRIME, AND AMERICAN CULTURE 159,
159-72 (1998) (describing how provisions such as legal segregation,
disenfranchisement, and capital punishment further alienated African Americans
from the legal system).
50. See PEREA ET AL., supra note 45, at 149 (citing Barbara Holden-Smith,
Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive
Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31 (1996) (providing a description of lynching as an
extralegal means of criminal enforcement)).
51. See Michael Mello, "In the Years When Murder Wore the Mask of Law":
Diary of a Capital Appeals Lawyer (1983-1986), 24 VT. L. REV. 583, 656 (2000).
52. See id. at 655-56.
53. Only in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), did the Supreme Court,
in the spirit of the Sixth Amendment, declare that indigent defendants must be
supplied with legal counsel.
54. It was not until Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), that the
Supreme Court ruled state law could not prohibit African-American men from
serving on juries. Even after Strauder, however, the Court upheld convictions of
African-American defendants by White juries. See COLE, supra note 21, at 106. It
was not until 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), that the Court held




This persisted throughout the civil rights era:
From the close of Reconstruction to the modern civil rights
revolution, law-enforcement played a central role in
maintaining the exclusion of African-Americans and other
minorities from the Nation's political life. When suspected,
however remotely, of wrongdoing, these citizens became the
targets of sweeping and invasive tactics of investigation. And
even when not, they remained subject to relentless official
intimidation, particularly when they dared to take actions
that challenged the white establishment's stranglehold over
political power. That intimidation sometimes took the form of
horrific state-sponsored violence, such as lynchings and the
beatings and killings of civil rights activists. But even more
frequently it came in the form of chronic, low-level harassment
through the discriminatory enforcement of vagrancy
ordinances and other "public order" laws. 55
Although the law eventually became facially neutral, 56 police
discretion permitted continuing disparate treatment. 57 The double
standard in the criminal justice system persists.
2. Contemporary Reasons for the Crisis
a. Disparate Impact
Today, police officers often stop and search a
disproportionately high number of minorities. 58 Similarly, the
highly discretionary "community policing"59 presents "heightened
risks of discriminatory law enforcement and inappropriate police
using peremptory challenges to strike jurors solely because of their race was
unconstitutional.
55. David M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword The Corning Crisis of
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEo. L.J. 1153, 1156 (1998).
56. The main tool the Court used to strike down laws that were not racially
neutral on their faces was the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down, on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds, a Virginia statute that prohibited interracial
marriage); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 500 (1954) (finding that segregation
of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives the children of the
minority group equal educational opportunities, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948)
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits judicial enforcement by state
courts of restrictive covenants based on race).
57. See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
58. See Cole, supra note 31, at 3.
59. "Community Policing" is a form of policing, persisting since its emergence in
the 1980s, that focuses on "prevalent and low-key troubles" in the community. See
Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 578 (1997). "Zero
tolerance policing" is perhaps its most insidious form. See Raja Mishra, Police Look
at Ways to Avoid Racial Profiling, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1999, Weekly, at 1.
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involvement in community life and private affairs"60 and may
allow for increased corruption. 61
One strain of community policing is the so-called "quality of
life policing."62  Proponents of this method link neighborhood
disorder with crime. 63 Robert Ellickson describes the problem as
follows:
[A] prolonged street nuisance may trigger broken-windows
syndrome. As time passes, unchecked street misconduct, like
unerased graffiti and unremoved litter, signals a lack of social
control. This encourages other users of the same space to
misbehave, creates a general apprehension in pedestrians, and
prompts defensive measures that may aggravate the
appearance of disorder. 64
Commentators criticize this "quality of life" policing as
dependent "upon making large numbers of stops and searches
without... individualized justification."65 Indeed, studies show a
shocking connection between race and inappropriate law
enforcement attention. 66
Although African Americans make up only 12% of the general
population, they comprise over 50% of the prison population.
67
Accordingly, one of four African-American males born today will
spend at least one year in jail.68 Moreover, "for every one black
man who graduates from college each year, another 100 will be
arrested."69 These disproportionate arrest and imprisonment rates
may be explained by the following statistics. Of federal cases
involving drug courier profiles over a five-year period, 95% of those
stopped were minorities. Likewise, 80% of pretext stops and 90%
of bus and train sweep cases involved minorities. 70 Similarly, in
60. Livingston, supra note 59, at 578.
61. See Wesley G. Skogan, The Impact of Community Policing on Neighborhood
Residents, in THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY POLICING 167, 177-79 (Dennis P.
Rosenbaum ed., 1994).
62. For a detailed discussion of the development of quality of life policing, see
Livingston, supra note 59, at 565-95.
63. See id.
64. Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1177
(1996) (internal citation omitted).
65. David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural Fairness
and Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 241.
66. See infra notes 67-79 and accompanying text. For a review of evidence
revealing racial targeting, see Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51
VAND. L. REV. 333, 334-54 (1998).






Volusia County, Florida, a review of videos from cameras mounted
on police cars revealed that, although only 5% of highway drivers
are people of color, African Americans and Hispanics represent
70% of all people stopped and 80% of all people searched.7
1
The disparate rates persist even when rates of crime
commission are statistically controlled. One researcher whose
work illustrates this point is Dr. John Lamberth, who studied all
arrests that resulted from stops on the New Jersey turnpike over a
three-year period.7 2 To discern the number of stops of African
Americans, Lamberth analyzed patrol activity logs and police
radio logs from randomly selected days.73 To document the racial
composition of people traveling on the turnpike, Lamberth's team
of research assistants, stationed at the side of the road, observed
and recorded the apparent race of each driver.74 Team members
then drove on the turnpike with their cruise control set five miles
above the posted speed limit and recorded the number of drivers
who passed them, taking care to note each driver's race.
75
Lamberth's results show that automobiles with an African-
American driver or passenger represented only 13.5% of those on
the turnpike. Lamberth found that although African-American
drivers exceeded the speed limit at the same rate as White drivers,
they represented 35% of those stopped. 6 Even more dramatically,
his results show that of all those arrested, 73.2% were African-
American. 77 Lamberth conducted a similar study in Maryland
with comparable results.78 In Maryland, Lamberth found that
even though African Americans were only 17.5% of the highway
population violating the traffic code, and were no more likely than
White drivers to break the traffic code, they accounted for 72% of
those stopped and searched.7 9
When considering the disparate impact of law enforcement
against racial minorities, it is apparent that our current law
71. See COLE, supra note 21, at 37.
72. See Harris, supra note 24, at 277-80 (citing Report of Dr. John Lamberth,
Plaintiffs Expert, Revised Statistical Analysis of the Incidence of Police Stops and
Arrests of Black Drivers/Travelers on the New Jersey Turnpike Between Exits or
Interchanges 1 and 3 from the Years 1988 Through 1991, at 2, State v. Pedro Soto,
734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996)).
73. See Harris, supra note 24, at 278.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 278-79.
77. See id. at 279.
78. See id. at 280-81 (relying on Report of Dr. John Lamberth, Plaintiffs Expert
at 9, Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, No. MJG-93-468 (D. Md. 1996)).
79. See id. at 280-81.
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enforcement practices are racially discriminatory.8 0  It is
important to note that some scholars do not find this problematic.
Professor Randal Kennedy, for example, believes that allegations
of a racist administration of justice are "overblown and
counterproductive."8' Kennedy believes that facially neutral laws
that have a racially disparate impact are not objectionable because
they "disadvantage some African-Americans while benefiting
others."8 2 Kennedy suggests that racial disparities "may be the
mark, not of a white-dominated state apparatus discriminating
against blacks, but instead, of a state apparatus responding
sensibly to the desires of law-abiding people - including the great
mass of black communities - for protection against criminals
preying upon them."83
Similarly, Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares feel
that, although community policing techniques in the 1960s were
racially enforced, this new wave of aggressive policing is immune
to racially motivated abuses. Kahan and Meares draw support for
this assertion by pointing to community support of community
policing techniques.8 4 "Far from being the targets of these new
law-enforcement strategies, inner-city minority residents are now
their primary sponsors. Flexing their newfound political muscle,
these citizens are demanding effective law enforcement. They
support discretionary community policing...."85
Kennedy, Kahan, and Meares fail to consider the growing
populations with more reason to fear police officers than to trust
them with the task of protecting their community. Initially, a
significant portion of the African-American population may have
favored aggressive policing.8 6 Indeed, increased police attention is
often requested by minority group members because they are
disproportionately the victims of crime.8 7 This initial support is
waning, however, because of the negative effects of increased
police attention in minority communities.88 Even if an increased
80. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.
81. Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A
Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1255-56 (1994).
82. Id. at 1257.
83. Id. at 1278 (internal quotations omitted).
84. See Kahan & Meares, supra note 55, at 1154.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 1163.
87. "African-Americans are considerably more likely than whites to be raped,
robbed, assaulted, and murdered." Kennedy, supra note 81, at 1255 (citation
omitted).
88. See Mike Tharp, L.A. Blues: Dirty Cops and Mean Streets, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 13, 2000, at 20; supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text
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police presence is responsible for a decrease in crime,89 the end
result may come at too great a compromise. For example, in the
now notorious Rampart neighborhood of Los Angeles,90 murder
has gone down significantly since police presence increased.91 But,
due to overwhelming resident harassment by police officers, "some
residents wonder whether such improvements have come at too
high a cost."92  Similarly, more than two-thirds of African
Americans in New York City feel that the policies of the Giuliani
administration, known for zero tolerance policing, have caused an
increase in police brutality.93
b. Police Illegality
The racially disparate enforcement of laws is only one source
of the present day crisis of legitimacy. Police lawlessness also
significantly contributes to the crisis. Several high-profile cases
reveal this phenomenon.94 The following examples are important
for three reasons. First, they illustrate the ways in which police
lawlessness manifests itself, while also depicting the obvious racial
component of these transgressions. Second, they represent some
of the high-profile cases that serve to fuel perceptions of
illegitimacy. Third, they provide clear-cut reasons for an innocent
person of color to run from the police, which sets the stage for a
discussion of Illinois v. Wardlow.
i. Rodney King
Perhaps one of the greatest fears of members of minority
communities regarding interactions with the police is that of
brutality.95 Brutality is "conduct that is not merely mistaken, but
taken in bad faith with the intent to dehumanize and degrade its
target. It is described as 'conscious and venal .... directed against
persons of marginal status and credibility,' and 'committed by
officers who often take great pains to conceal their conduct."'96
(providing examples of how high arrest rates affect the African-American
population).
89. This is debatable. See infra notes 187-197 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 125-135 and accompanying text.
91. See Tharp, supra note 88, at 21.
92. Id.
93. See Dan Barry & Marjorie Connelly, Poll In New York Finds Many Think
Police are Biased, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at Al.
94. See infra notes 97-132 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
96. Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF.
L. REV. 1275, 1276 (1999) (quoting JAMES SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE
LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 19 (1993)).
2001]
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The most well-known police brutality case to date is that of
Rodney King.
Los Angeles police officers stopped Rodney King for speeding
early on March 3, 1991. 97 Although King claims he cooperated
with the officers, they clubbed him over fifty times and kicked him
at least seven times. 98 A local resident caught the incident on
video and released it to the news.99 For mainstream Americans,
the King incident was their first glimpse at police brutality. But
for much of the minority community, it was a confirmation of what
they already knew. 100 The sergeant charged with assaulting King
admitted it was the worst beating he had ever seen, but claimed
that it was not excessive. 101
ii. Abner Louima
Five years after King, another police brutality incident
grabbed the media's attention. This time, the abuse was
discovered because the victim was hospitalized. 10 2 In confusion
arising from a brawl outside a Brooklyn club on Saturday, August
9, 1997, police officers arrested Abner Louima for disorderly
conduct, obstructing governmental administration, and resisting
arrest.103 Officers Schwarz and Wiese, believing Louima was
responsible for hitting Officer John Volpe, stopped the patrol car
on the way the to the precinct and beat Louima. 10 4 Before
reaching the precinct, the officers met up with Volpe who again
beat Louima on his head and face with a radio and a closed fist.105
97. King claimed he was driving forty-five miles per hour in a thirty-five mile
per hour zone. See Deborah Hastings & Jeff Wilson, How Video Turned L.A Bust
into Police Brutality Scandal Beating of Black Man Taped by Neighbor, Broadcast
on National TV; Outrage Followed, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 7, 1991, at A4, available
at 1991 WL 8925015. L.A. Police claimed he was driving over one hundred miles
per hour. See id.
98. See Robert Reinhold, Criminal Charges Sought in Beating: LA Chief
Concedes 'Excessive Force' Used, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 8, 1991, at 2, available at
1991 WL 3907516.
99. See id.
100. Civil liberties organizations in Los Angeles receive an average of fifty-five
police brutality complaints per week. See Hastings & Wilson, supra note 97, at A4.
101. See New York Times, Koon Calls Beating Worst He's Seen: Sergeant
Testifies Force Justified, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 22, 1992, at N6, available at 1992
WL 8160982.
102. See David Kocieniewski, Injured Man Says Brooklyn Officers Tortured Him
in Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at B1.
103. See id.
104. See United States v. Volpe, 78 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). In fact, it
was Louima's cousin who hit Volpe. See id.
105. See id. at 80.
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At the station, Volpe and Schwarz took Louima into a
bathroom and sodomized him with a broom handle. 106 Volpe then
shoved the feces- and blood-covered broom handle into Louima's
mouth, breaking several teeth. 107 Louima was hospitalized for
over a month with injuries to the head, bladder, rectum, and
colon. 108 Louima is Haitian; John Volpe is White. 10 9
iii. Amadou Diallo
A recent high-profile incident involving a single suspect of
color is the shooting of Amadou Diallo. On February 4, 1999, New
York City police officers in an unmarked police car saw Amadou
Diallo standing in the vestibule of his building. 110 Without any
particularized suspicion, an officer got out of the car and asked
Diallo to talk with him.' Diallo ducked into his apartment and
came back with his wallet."12 The four officers, who later testified
that they perceived the wallet to be a gun, opened fire. 113 Of the
forty-one shots fired, nineteen hit Diallo, who died instantly."14 All
of the officers involved were acquitted.115
iv. Area Two
Thus far, the discussion of police lawlessness has revolved
around single incidents and might therefore be characterized as
unique occurrences. 116  Other cases, however, involve the
complicity of many officers and affect dozens of suspects over a
period of years.
Area Two is a violent crimes unit that covers the south side of
Chicago."I' Criminal defendants have accused several officers
from this unit of brutally torturing more than sixty suspects in
106. See id.
107. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1166 (1999).
108. See Volpe, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 81.
109. See Alfieri, supra note 107, at 1157.
110. See Jane Fritsch, Two Officers Back Story of Partners: They Say They
Thought Diallo Was Holding Gun, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2000, at B1; John J.
Goldman, 4 White Officers are Acquitted in Death of Diallo, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26,
2000, at Al.
111. See Goldman, supra note 110, at Al.
112. See Fritsch, supra note 110, at B1.
113. See id.
114. See id.; Goldman supra note 110, at Al.
115. See Goldman, supra note 110, at Al.
116. See supra notes 95-114 and accompanying text. Of the Rodney King
incident, Police Chief Daryl Gates said, "This is an aberration." Associated Press,
Police Chief Says Officers Should Face Felony Charges in Beating, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1991, at 20A, available at 1991 WL 9127290.
117. See Bandes, supra note 96, at 1276.
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order to extract confessions. 118 The suspects claimed that torture
took the form of the police suffocating them with a typewriter
cover; putting a revolver in their mouths; playing Russian roulette;
squeezing their testicles; electrically shocking them; forcing them
against a hot radiator; and punching, kicking, and choking
them.1 19
This extreme brutality had a racial element. "It eventually
became known that over a period of at least thirteen years,
starting in the early 1970's, more than sixty men, all of them
black, had been systematically tortured by members of a group of
approximately fifteen Area Two officers, all of them white."' 120 One
suspect's description of the brutality indicates the racial
motivation of the officers:
[A]t approximately 2:30 a.m., defendant was taken to another
room where he was handcuffed behind his back. Detectives
Peter Dignan and Charles Grunhard, and police sergeant John
Byrne interviewed defendant and confronted him with
accusations which he persisted in denying. Defendant
testified that Byrne put a chrome .45 caliber automatic gun
with a brown handle in his mouth and told him that he should
blow off his head because he knew what they were talking
about. In addition, Byrne struck defendant three or four times
across the left side of his chest and stomach with a flashlight
while his wrists were handcuffed behind his back. Defendant
fell out of the chair and Grunhard kicked him in his side,
stomach and ankle, and hit him on the back of his legs with a
flashlight.
When defendant continued to deny knowledge of what the
officers were talking about, Dignan said "we have something
for niggers" and he put a plastic bag over defendant's head.
12 1
The court held that evidence of this incident was admissible in
trial in order for the jury to determine whether the confession was
coerced. 122
v. Los Angeles Police Anti-Gang Unit
Although widespread corruption may occur in some police
departments, 23 the Los Angeles Police Department is worth
118. See id. at 1276-77.
119. See id. at 1276, 1290, 1294.
120. Id. at 1288-89.
121. People v. Banks, 549 N.E.2d 766, 767 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
122. See id. at 771.
123. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 21, at 24 (describing a neighborhood in North
Philadelphia where "a group of police officers ... engaged in a widespread practice
of beatings and robbing citizens, planting evidence, and lying to support false
convictions"); Ex Officer's Account of Brutal Police Fraternity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
1993, at 83 (acknowledging random beatings by Bronx police officers); supra notes
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exploring in more detail because its issues are so timely. The Los
Angeles Police Department was perhaps just recovering from the
King incident when stories of widespread corruption in "CRASH,"
the department's elite anti-gang unit, began to surface. 124 The
corruption took place mainly in the Rampart area, home to mostly
poor Koreans and Hispanics. 125  Allegations included police
brutality, planting and rearranging evidence, lying under oath,
and shooting unarmed suspects. 126 Further allegations pointed to
intimidation of witnesses. 127
The investigation began when a court convicted Officer
Rafael Perez of stealing three kilograms of cocaine from a police
evidence locker.128 In exchange for a lighter sentence, Perez broke
the silence surrounding the corruption. 129 Among other things,
Perez admitted that he and his partner shot an unarmed suspect,
paralyzing him, and then lied about it under oath.130 Perez also
admitted to killing an unarmed suspect and planting a gun on him
before calling an ambulance. 131 At the time of this writing, the Los
Angeles Police Department has placed more than seventy officers
under suspicion and overturned more than one hundred criminal
convictions as a result of police illegality in Rampart. 132
These outrageous examples of lawlessness may be labeled as
extreme or unusual. Although some were seemingly isolated
incidents, 133 many involved multiple officers and persisted for a
number of years, 134 indicating that this behavior is common or
tolerated. Even if one believes that these incidents are truly
unique occurrences that do not represent the system as a whole,
they are high-profile enough to be salient events in the minds of
many minority citizens. Thus, these examples influence their
perceptions of police illegitimacy. As discussed below, it is this
117-122 and accompanying text (describing corruption in a Chicago precinct).
124. See Rene Sanchez, LAPD Reeling As Corruption Cases Multiply: Probe
Finds False Arrests, Other Abuses Widespread, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2000, at Al.
125. See Tharp, supra note 88, at 20.
126. See Sanchez, supra note 124, at Al.
127. See Donna Foote & Anna Figueroa, ime and Again, I Stepped Over the
Line', NEWSWEEK, Mar. 6, 2000, at 25.
128. See id.
129. See Sanchez, supra note 124, at Al.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See Ann W. O'Neill & Henry Weinstein, In Blow to Rampart Case, Perez
Unlikely to Testify in Court: Prosecutors will not give him immunity in murder
probe. Expert calls developments 'a bombshell., L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2000, at A23.
133. See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 117-132 and accompanying text.
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perception of illegitimacy that has devastating effects on crime
prevention efforts.1 35
II. Illinois v. Wardlow and the Crisis of Legitimacy
As the discussion above reveals, the crisis of legitimacy is
pervasive and constant. 136 Still, courts fail to acknowledge the
extent of the crisis and the impact it has on policing efforts.
Because of this, when courts engage in a Fourth Amendment
balancing test, they neglect to weigh the real costs. Not only are
their conclusions grossly inaccurate, they are also dangerous
because they condone behavior that will only further compound
the legitimacy crisis and accordingly, undermine the very interests
that they are trying to advance.
A. The Fourth Amendment Balancing Test
As the discussion in Section I indicates, without proper
protections, law enforcement is racially discriminatory.1 37 The
Fourth Amendment provides one check on this type of government
intrusion.138  The Fourth Amendment is important to any
discussion of street law enforcement because it applies to all
searches and seizures of the person, including "seizures that
involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest."'139
The Fourth Amendment's protections, however, are not
absolute. In determining whether police activity violates the
Fourth Amendment, courts engage in a balancing test weighing
the legitimate interests of law enforcement against "the
individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers." 140  Accordingly, law enforcement
must have suspicion particular to the suspect in order to justify a
search. For a full search, "probable cause" is the level of suspicion
necessary.141 Probable cause requires that the facts available to
the officer would "warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe
135. See infra notes 187-221 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
138. In part, the Fourth Amendment was a reaction to the Writs of Assistance
that the British used to justify suspicionless searches of the colonists. See
Rudovsky, supra note 65, at 242. These Writs have been denounced by some as
"the worst instrument of arbitrary power... because they placed the liberty of
every man in the hands of every petty officer." Id. (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.S. 476, 481-82 (1965) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886))).
139. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
140. Id. at 878.
141. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
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that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful
as evidence of a crime." 142
However, the Supreme Court has articulated a lesser
standard of suspicion for a minimal pat-down search.1 43 In Terry
v. Ohio, the Court held that a stop and frisk, absent probable
cause, is allowed provided that there is "reasonable suspicion" that
crime is afoot. 144 Although the threshold of suspicion warranting
the stop and frisk is small, the officer is still required to justify the
stop by citing to some factor that gave rise to an articulable,
individualized suspicion. 45 Of course, the suspect's race is not a
constitutional reason, and the Court has previously noted that an
individual's presence in a high-crime area is only one factor among
several that would support a reasonable particularized suspicion
of criminal activity. 146 In addition, the Court has stated that
refusing to talk to a police officer or simply "going on one's own
way" is not sufficient to trigger reasonable suspicion. 147 What is
now sufficient to satisfy "reasonable suspicion," however, is an
individual fleeing from the police in a high-crime neighborhood. 148
B. Illinois v. Wardlow
Sam Wardlow stood on the street in an area of Chicago
known for heavy narcotics trafficking. 149 A police caravan drove
through the area and, upon seeing the cars, Wardlow ran. 150
Officers Nolan and Harvey caught up with him and conducted a
Terry stop. 151 They discovered a handgun and arrested him.
5 2
Wardlow argued that the gun should be suppressed because its
seizure was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 1
53
The trial court denied Wardlow's motion to suppress the
evidence of the gun, and convicted him of unlawful possession of a
weapon by a felon. 154 The Illinois Appellate Court reversed,
142. Id. at 731.
143. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
144. See id. at 30.
145. See id.
146. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972).
147. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983).
148. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (holding that flight from law
enforcement officials in a high-crime area is sufficient to warrant reasonable
suspicion).
149. See id. at 674.
150. See id. at 673.
151. See id. at 673-74.
152. See id. at 674.
153. See id. at 675.
154. See People v. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d 65, 66 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
20011
Law and Inequality
reasoning that there was insufficient evidence in the record to
indicate that the search and seizure was justified by having
occurred in a high-crime neighborhood. 55 The Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that flight in a high-crime area cannot
create reasonable suspicion. 56  The court stated that every
individual has the right to avoid the police should they so
choose. 157 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and held that flight from police in a high-crime neighborhood is
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. 158
What follows is a deconstruction of the Fourth Amendment
balancing test as applied in this case. Noting how the crisis of
legitimacy alters the equation at each level of this analysis, it
becomes apparent that the Court is disserving the Constitution
and law enforcement efforts by failing to be cognizant of the crisis.
1. The Court Did Not Sufficiently Recognize the
Infringement of a Wardlow Stop on the Innocent
On one side of the scale are the rights of the individual. 159
The Court describes these rights as an individual's interest in
being free from unreasonable government intrusion. 60 A look at
the toll that legitimacy issues have taken on innocent minorities
reveals the disparity between the weight the Wardlow Court
attributes to the infringement on individuals' rights and the real
costs.
a. Innocent Minorities Have Reason to Run
The Fourth Amendment is not absolute. It protects
individuals from only unreasonable government intrusions into
their privacy.' 6 1 Those who believe Wardlow stops are not an
unreasonable intrusion hypothesize that only guilty people have
an incentive to run, and therefore there is no violation for the
reasonable innocent citizen. 162 This reasoning is flawed, however,
because there are many reasons why an innocent person in a high-
155. See id. at 67-68.
156. See People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484, 486 (Ill. 1998).
157. See id. at 487.
158. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000).
159. For a discussion of the Fourth Amendment balancing test, see generally
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 408 (1997); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
160. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 534 (1985) (citing United States v.
United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 299 (1972)).
161. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.




crime neighborhood may feel it is prudent to avoid the police.
Legitimacy issues inform many of these reasons.
First, minorities may have no other choice. While the Court
held that an individual has the right to simply refuse to talk with
the police, 163 incidents of police corruption tell another story. 164 If
the individual refuses to consent to a search, the officer may
search anyway and then lie about consent. 165 In addition, the
officer may plant evidence on the individual. 166 Accordingly, an
innocent person in a high-crime neighborhood may feel that he or
she must run or risk being framed by the police.
Second, many people of color may fear for their personal
safety. Stories of police brutality of minority group members are
widespread. 167 In addition to the Area Two and Rampart scandals
discussed above, 168 credible reports show that in the past police
officers in the Bronx randomly beat people up in high-crime
neighborhoods, simply to assert their authority. 169 An interview
between a New York Times reporter and a Bronx police officer
reflects the random and unpredictable nature of this violence:
Did you beat people up you arrested?
No. We'd just beat people in general. If they're on the
street, hanging around drug locations. It was a show of
force.
Why were those beatings done?
To show who was in charge. We were in charge, the
police.170
In addition to the fear of being beaten by the police is the
knowledge that there is little hope of justice afterward. The "blue
wall of silence" is known to the public, and common sense tells
minorities that it is unlikely that a court will believe their story
over a police officer's. 17' Thus, an innocent person, for whom
stories of police brutality are all too salient, may choose to exercise
his right to avoid the police.
163. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
164. See Brief for Respondent at 10, Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000)
(No. 98-1036) (stating that "experience teaches - and empirical research confirms -
that officers often initiate such encounters in bad faith, with little regard to those
citizens' basic human dignity, let alone their constitutional rights").
165. See COLE, supra note 21, at 33-34 (writing that federal inmates of color
expressed these concerns to one of his students).
166. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 95-171 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 116-132 and accompanying text.
169. See Ex-officer's Account of Brutal Police Fraternity, supra note 123, at 83.
170. Bob Herbert, Connect the Dots, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1997, § 4, at 13.
171. See Bandes, supra note 96, at 1276.
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The crisis of illegitimacy thus informs people of color that,
despite Florida v. Royer,' 72 they do not have a right to simply
refuse to engage with the police. Personal experience, stories from
others in their communities, and high-profile media events have
taught many innocent minority group members that the only way
to ensure that they will not be searched, framed, or beaten is to
avoid the police, even if that means running from them. 173 Justice
Stevens's dissent in Wardlow summarizes this point:
Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing
in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing
person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification,
believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous ....
For such a person, unprovoked flight is neither 'aberrant' nor
'abnormal.' Moreover, these concerns and fears are known to
the police officers themselves, and are validated by law
enforcement investigations into their own practices. 1
74
b. The Level of Intrusion Is Significant
In Terry, the Court characterized a stop and frisk as a "minor
inconvenience and petty indignity."'175 The crisis of legitimacy,
however, elevates a Terry stop into a major intrusion that should
weigh heavily in the Fourth Amendment balancing test. First, the
pervasive nature of racial profiling 7 6 may result in multiple stops
of the same innocent person of color.177 While the first stop may
truly be a "minor inconvenience" or a "petty indignity," the second,
third, and fourth stops become unreasonable government
intrusions. Each stop is a humiliating reminder of state-
sanctioned racism. 178
In addition, even for the innocent person who is stopped just
once, the crisis of legitimacy suggests that the encounter is not a
mere inconvenience because it produces terror in the individual
stopped. 79 Rightly or wrongly, people of color believe that police
172. 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (holding that not talking to police is not sufficient to
trigger reasonable suspicion).
173. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 680-81 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
174. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) (quoting People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d
32, 36 (N.Y. 1964)).
176. See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
177. See Harris, supra note 24, at 271-73.
178. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (recognizing the
psychological injury resulting from the shame and anger of being marginalized and
oppressed).
179. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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rate people along racial lines. 8 0 As mentioned above, a New York
City poll revealed that 90% of African Americans thought the
police engaged in brutality against minorities.181  This fear,
compounded by high-profile police brutality cases,18 2 leads to a
high level of anxiety regarding interactions with the police. This
anxiety and fear elevates a Terry stop from a "mere intrusion" to a
potentially life threatening event.18 3
2. The Court Gave Undue Weight to Law Enforcement
Interests
Even if the stop condoned in Wardlow adversely affects
innocent people, as the previous section indicates, it may still pass
constitutional muster if the law enforcement interests are strong
enough. 8 4 The Court held that the defendant's flight in a high-
crime area created a reasonable suspicion, 8 5 even if such
reasoning might result in innocent people being stopped. 186 The
effects of the crisis of legitimacy, however, predict that the law
enforcement interests are actually quite small, and perhaps even
nonexistent.
a. Aggressive Policing May Not Decrease Crime
There is no consensus on the success of community policing.
One reviewer, examining research from the mid-1990s, concluded
that studies of community policing "have generally shown that
community policing has had a small effect or has produced
contradictory results."'8 7  In accordance with this, studies
examining the effects of random patrolling reveal that increasing
the degree of "police presence" by adding police to patrol
"randomly" has no effect on crime.18 8
Further, seemingly positive results may be due to factors
other than community policing. For example, in New York the
180. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 95-171 and accompanying text.
183. See Brief for Respondent at 10, Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000)
(No. 98-1036).
184. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
185. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000).
186. See id. at 677.
187. DAVID BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 117 (1994).
188. See Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing for Crime Prevention, in PREVENTING
CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING 8-1, at 8-11 to 8-12
(Lawrence W. Sherman ed. 1997) (citing GEORGE L. KELLING ET AL., THE KANSAS
CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT: TECHNICAL REPORT (1974) and POLICE
FOUNDATION, THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT (1981)).
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homicide rate decreased by more than 50% between 1990 and
1996.189 It is debatable, however, whether this can be attributed
to policing efforts when other cities used different techniques but
had similar drops in crime. 190 Additionally, some areas that
experienced the crime reduction under community policing are
now showing an increase. 191 It does seem, however, that increased
police presence that is directed at high-crime areas does lead to a
decrease in crime. 192 For example, one study indicates that an
increase in foot patrol may decrease crime. 193
Another study that seemingly supports the "broken windows"
hypothesis 194 but is susceptible to other interpretations is Wesley
Skogan's Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral Decay in
American Neighborhoods.195 Bernard Harcourt, after re-analyzing
Skogan's data concluded that "Skogan's study does not verify the
broken windows hypothesis, and the causes of the decline in crime
in New York City are far too contested to lend themselves to such
simplistic analysis."'196 Even Skogan, a staunch advocate of
189. See Jenny Berrien & Christopher Winship, Lessons Learned from Boston's
Police-Conimunity Collaboration, 63 FED. PROBATION 25, 25 (1999) (citing FBI,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1991-1996)).
190. See COLE, supra note 21, at 192-94 (noting that crime dropped in Boston
and San Diego without using the aggressive "zero-tolerance" law enforcement
common to community policing strategies). Instead, Cole points to forms of
community policing that are "community-based crime prevention." Id. at 192. This
type of community policing "tries to make police an integral part of the
neighborhoods they serve through more decentralized police stations, more foot
patrols, and regular meetings with citizens in the community." Id. Cole also cites
efforts to keep children in school, mentoring, and developing effective channels for
communication between the police and the community. See id. at 192-93.
191. See Berrien & Winship, supra note 189, at 25 (citing Fred Kaplan, Brooklyn
Adopts 'Boston Plan' on Savings, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 14, 1999 (reporting that
Brooklyn is now experiencing an eight percent increase in homicide rates)).
192. See Sherman, supra note 188, at 8-17 (stating "the more arrests police make
in response to reported or observed offenses of any kind, the less crime there will
be").
193. See id. at 8-12 (citing Robert Trojanowicz, Evaluating a Neighborhood Foot
Patrol Prograni: The Flint, Michigan Project, in COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION:
DOES IT WORK? (Dennis P. Rosenbaum ed. 1986)).
194. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 31 (introducing the broken-window theory, which
hypothesizes that if one window in a building is broken and not repaired, all the
rest of the windows will soon be broken because failure to fix the first window is a
signal that no one cares).
195. See WESLEY SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL
DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 2 (1990) (stating, in introducing the book,
that when a community is in a state of disorder, people in that community are not
expected to act in an orderly fashion, and that this phenomenon is a major catalyst
of urban decline).
196. Bernard Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social
Influence Conception of Deterrence, The Broken Windows Theory, and Order-
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community policing, admits that "the evidence is mixed."'197
Accordingly, aggressive policing may not have any direct benefit to
law enforcement interests.
b. Aggressive Policing May Frustrate Other Areas of the
Criminal Justice System
Because the crisis of legitimacy undermines the criminal
justice system at many levels, and because Wardlow can only
serve to exacerbate the crisis, its costs are wide spread. The
Wardlow Court held that running from the police constitutes
reasonable suspicion only in high-crime neighborhoods. 198 High-
crime neighborhoods have an extensive minority population. 199
Thus, Wardlow stops will have a disproportionate impact on
people of color. This effect is compounded by the fact that people
of color have a greater incentive to run from the police in the first
place.200  Because Wardlow stops exacerbate the crisis of
legitimacy, Wardlow may have an adverse effect not only on crime
prevention but also on other law enforcement practices as well.
The effects of the crisis are two-fold. First, with a loss of
faith in the system comes an unwillingness to cooperate.
20 1
Second, when individuals lose respect for the system, they are
more inclined to defy it.202 Accordingly, legitimacy problems may
lead to an increase in crime. 20 3 These results, in turn, create a
feedback loop that leads to the failure of law enforcement
efforts.204
Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 309 (1998).
197. Skogan, supra note 61, at 178.
198. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000).
199. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
tbl.44 (1999).
200. See supra notes 162-174 and accompanying text.
201. See TYLER, supra note 20, at 5 (discussing the role of perception of
procedural fairness in conceptions of legitimacy); see also KITTRIE, supra note 22, at
163-67 (providing a historical overview of responses to erosion of legitimacy); Cole,
supra note 31, at 3 (asserting that perception of unfairness leads to less likelihood
of cooperation).
202. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
203. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 64, 76-81 (1988) (discussing the role of procedural fairness in
conception of legitimacy); see also Eleanor Brown, Black Like Me? "Gangsta"
Culture, Clarence Thonias, and Afrocentric Acadenies, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 334-
35 (2000) (discussing how law breakers in the African-American community can be
treated as figures to be admired rather than condemned); Cole, supra note 31, at 3
(explaining that people who have lost respect for the law are more likely to break it
themselves).
204. See Sherman, supra note 188, at 8-22 to 8-25 (providing a scientific
evaluation of eight hypotheses on policing).
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i. Unwillingness to Cooperate
Research establishes that one result of the crisis of legitimacy
is a loss of faith in the system. 20 5  From that grows an
unwillingness to cooperate. 20 6 "[B]ecause legitimacy in the eyes of
the public is a key precondition to the effectiveness of
authorities[,] ... legitimacy will affect the degree to which people
comply with laws in their everyday lives."207  In the American
system, this unwillingness manifests itself at every stage of our
criminal justice system.208
At the participation level, be it during a crime investigation
or serving as a witness or juror, resistance may come from a
subtle, perhaps unconscious, rejection of an unjust criminal justice
system.20 9 Of this rejection John Edgar Wideman said:
[W]e can't help but feel some satisfaction seeing a brother, a
black man, get over on these people, on their system without
playing by their rules. No matter how much we have
incorporated these rules as our own, we know that they were
forced on us by people who did not have our best interests at
heart.210
Those citizens who do participate in the system may rebel
against the law through jury nullification. 21' A staunch supporter
of race-based jury nullification, Paul Butler describes the moral
reasons why African-American jurors should refuse to convict non-
violent African-American defendants:
[Flor pragmatic and political reasons, the black community is
better off when some nonviolent lawbreakers remain in the
community rather than go to prison. The decision as to what
kind of conduct by African-Americans ought to be punished is
better made by African-Americans themselves, based on the
costs and benefits to their community, than by traditional
criminal justice process, which is controlled by white
lawmakers and white law enforcers.212
Thus, Wardlow stops may thwart law enforcement efforts by
frustrating minority members' cooperation with the criminal
justice system as a whole.
205. See TYLER, supra note 20, at 5.
206. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
207. TYLER, supra note 20, at 5.
208. See Cole, supra note 31, at 3.
209. See Harris, supra note 24, at 268-69.
210. Brown, supra note 203, at 334-35 (quoting JOHN EDGAR WIDEMAN,
BROTHERS AND KEEPERS 57 (1984)).
211. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700-12 (1995).
212. Id. at 679.
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ii. Increased Law Breaking by Citizens
In addition to subverting the system's processes, the crisis
may actually result in increased crime. With a loss of respect for
the legitimacy of the law comes an increased willingness to break
the law.213 Fear of punishment is only part of what motivates
individuals to follow the law.214 Internal and community morals
may be more powerful bases for compliance with the law.21 5 When
one questions the legitimacy of the system, one is much more
likely to violate that system's rules. 216 In addition, when one's
community also questions the system's legitimacy, non-compliance
at the individual level is more likely. 217  Lawbreaking then
becomes not only socially acceptable, but also "romanticized,
idealized, condoned or even celebrated."218
Research of America's inner cities supports this hypothesis.
Although one study suggests that arrest rates above a "tipping
point" have a deterrent effect on crime, the statistical support for
this finding was weak.21 9 Most studies find no deterrent effect
from increased reactive arrest rates at either an individual or
community level of analysis. 220 In fact, the most striking findings
indicate that arrest rates actually correlate with increased
criminal activity in juvenile populations. 221
By failing to recognize the dynamics involved in the crisis of
legitimacy, the Court in Wardlow engaged in a misguided
balancing test.222  Legitimacy issues frustrate the goals of
Wardlow stops by rendering them ineffective or at least so
213. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
214. See TYLER, supra note 20, at 3-4.
215. See id. at 4.
216. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
217. See Regina Austin, "The Black Community,"Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics
of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1772-76 (1992) (discussing the way in
which many African-American communities vacillate between ostracizing criminals
or identifying with them and approving of their behavior as a form of race
resistance).
218. David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the
New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1091 (1999); see also Austin,
supra note 217, at 1776-80 (discussing how crime can provide social and
occupational identity in addition to financial returns).
219. See Sherman, supra note 188, at 8-16 to 8-17. The "tipping point" is the
threshold beyond which the effect of increased arrest rates becomes evident. See
id. at 8-16. Even with this point, the conclusion that arrests above it deter crime is
evident only in cities of 10,000 or more people. See id.
220. See id. Reactive arrest rates are those in response to citizen complaints.
See id.
221. See id.
222. See supra Part II.B.
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marginally effective that they do not outweigh the interests behind
government intrusion. In addition, Wardlow stops may undermine
other crime prevention efforts by fueling the crisis.
III. Ameliorating the Effects of Wardlow
The implications of Wardlow are enormous. The decision
allows police to translate flight into reasonable suspicion only in
high-crime neighborhoods, 223 the very neighborhoods in which
legitimacy is most at issue. The negative ramifications 224 of the
Supreme Court's decision in Wardlow on legitimacy issues and
crime prevention call for development of solutions at all levels of
the criminal process. The following are suggestions for ways that
police departments, state legislatures and courts may ameliorate
the adverse effects of the Wardlow decision.
A. Local Police Departments
First, changes can be made in the police departments
themselves. After learning about the dynamics between
legitimacy and crime prevention, departments can adopt
procedures that lessen the discretion involved in policing, or at
least educate their officers to use discretion in a race-neutral
manner. One commentator recommends recruiting police
executives to research and understand the problems of police-
community relations.225
Police departments can also shift to a less combative policing
style. Recent trends like "zero tolerance" policing have frustrated
urban citizens because of the resulting "overloaded criminal
courts, overcrowded jails, and surge in complaints of police
abuse." 226 On the other hand, community law enforcement efforts
that focus on creating a mutual trust between the police and
neighborhood residents have actually resulted in a decrease in
crime concomitant with a decrease in arrest rates. 227 For example,
the Boston Police Department created a system that formed a
relatively closer, more cooperative relationship between the police
and the community. 228 Boston's program strategically focuses on
223. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000).
224. See supra Part II.
225. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Terry and Community Policing, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1265, 1269 (1998).
226. COLE, supra note 21, at 193.
227. See id. at 193-94.
228. See Berrien & Winship, supra note 189, at 25-32 (contrasting New York
City's aggressive battle against crime with Boston's overhaul of police and
probation practices that emphasize community-based approaches).
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problem areas and problem youth, and involves police
partnerships with the Boys and Girls Club of Boston, schools,
universities, and churches in working toward crime prevention. 22
9
Unfortunately, there remain substantial barriers to these
efforts. First, many police view their job as combat. "[T]he cops
and the gangs are the two rival sources of power.., and the gangs
are not going to win."230  As a former New York City police
commissioner stated, "criminals are our competition."23 1  In
addition, there is a police mentality that ordinary legal processes
are inadequate to maintain order and that officers are therefore
justified in using extralegal measures as social custodians. 232
With this strong culture in place, it seems unlikely that a police
department will comprehend the true dynamics of legitimacy and
law enforcement efficacy.
Another avenue of police department reform is the hiring of
more minority officers. Diversifying the force by adding officers
who do not believe crime has a black or brown face can help break
down the stereotypes that other officers hold.233 There are,
however, a number of impediments to these efforts. First,
minority police officers coming from a community in which police
legitimacy is already suspect risk losing the respect of their family
and friends. 234  Second, predominately White precincts may
maintain racist viewpoints resulting in a racially hostile work
environment for minority officers. 235  Third, physical
requirements, such as those for height and eyesight, tend to have
a disparate impact on African-American, Latino, and Asian
applicants. 236 Accordingly, police departments may not be the
most realistic avenue for change.
B. State Legislatures
State legislatures present another avenue for mitigating the
negative effects of Wardlow stops on legitimacy. Legislatures
229. See COLE, supra note 21, at 193.
230. Harcourt, supra note 196, at 377 (quoting Wilson & Kelling, supra note 194,
at 35).
231. Id. at 337.
232. See Alexa P. Freedman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of
Just Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 698-99 (1996).
233. For a discussion on the way in which exposure to racial groups can break
down stereotypes, see John Charles Boger, Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial
Purity and the Resegregation of Public Schools, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1719, 1765-67 &
nn.215-16 (2000).





should be interested in protecting their minority citizens from
state-sanctioned harassment and adopting policies that promote
the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. Therefore, the
legislature should pass--laws that forbid Wardlow stops. In
addition to these means for restoring legitimacy, the legislature
may want to pass laws that require public reporting of the racial
character of police practices. 237  Public reporting and the
elimination of hurdles to bringing challenges to discriminatory
practices may "provide avenues for airing and adjudicating
charges of race discrimination... [and may] go far toward
restoring the criminal justice system's legitimacy among
disadvantaged communities."238
C. State Courts
Lastly, change can be effected at the judicial level. Many
state courts have held that that fleeing from the police in a high-
crime neighborhood does not rise to the level of reasonable
suspicion. 239 These states recognize that "[a]uthorizing the police
to chase down and question all those who take flight upon their
approach would undercut this important right [of law-abiding
citizens to eschew interactions with the police] and upset the
balance struck in Terry between the individual's right to personal
security and the public's interest in prevention of crime."240 For
example, the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized that:
From the perspective of the person observed, the "furtive
gesture" might be impelled by a variety of motives, from an
unsettling feeling of being watched to an avoidance of what
might be perceived as a form of harassment .... Then again,
a person's movement may not be a reaction to the police at
all.
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nebraska recognized that the
desire to avoid police was not necessarily indicative of a guilty
conscience. 242 Indeed, this aversion could arise from a host of
reasons: "[flear or dislike of authority, distaste for police officers
based upon past experience, exaggerated fears of police brutality
or harassment, and fear of unjust arrest .. 243
237. See COLE, supra note 21, at 188.
238. Id. at 189.
239. See State v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Neb. 1992) (citing cases in other
jurisdictions holding that flight alone is insufficient to justify an investigative stop).
240. Id. at 364.
241. People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Colo. 1983).




Although Wardlow overrules the state decisions decided on
federal constitutional grounds, most states have search and
seizure provisions in their own constitutions that restrict
unreasonable government intrusion into the affairs of their
citizens. 244 Under new federalism principles, 245 a state court may
interpret these provisions more broadly than the Fourth
Amendment. 246 Accordingly, state courts can perform their own
balancing tests, taking the real costs of Wardlow stops into
account. They can conclude that under their constitutions, these
stops constitute an unreasonable search and seizure because the
intrusion on the privileges of innocent citizens outweighs the
minimal benefits to crime reduction.
Conclusion
There is a widespread crisis of legitimacy in our country, and
it is justified. Anecdotal and statistical evidence demonstrates
that discriminatory police practices, ranging from the use of racial
profiling in traffic stops to the more extreme occasions of police
brutality, create a system of law enforcement that is at best
arbitrary and, at worst, insidiously racist and lawless. Despite
this widespread crisis, its costs are neither incorporated into law
enforcement policies nor considered in the judicial review of these
policies. The result is a balancing test that purports to take into
account individual and government interests, but is ultimately
flawed in the values it assigns.
This discord, best exemplified by Illinois v. Wardlow, results
in a regime that allows unconstitutional government intrusions,
which may actually serve to undermine the very goals it seeks to
promote. Because innocent people of color have good reason to run
from the police, Wardlow stops are an unreasonable government
intrusion. Moreover, because they will have a disparate impact
244. For example, the Colorado Constitution states:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects,
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any
place or seize any person or things shall issue without describing the place
to be searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as near as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to
writing.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7.
245. "'[N]ew' federalism seeks to elevate the power of state governments over
that of the federal government and, in part, encourages state governments to
pursue their own constitutional rights agendas." Mitchell F. Crusto, The Supreme
Court's "New" Federalism: An Anti-Rights Agenda?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 517, 519
(2000).
246. See People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 151 (Colo. 1983).
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on minorities, Wardlow stops will reinforce the crisis of legitimacy.
Not only will they have a minimal direct effect on crime
prevention, but they also will compound the existing crisis and
frustrate other efforts of the criminal justice system. Accordingly,
police departments, state legislatures, and courts must be
cognizant of the intersection of legitimacy issues and law
enforcement procedures, and embrace policies that help ameliorate
this conflict. Only then can we move toward a more just and
effective system of law enforcement.
